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This article makes two contributions to the literature linking penalties charged by competition
authorities to observed cartel price overcharges. (i) It extends the theory of optimal penalties by
introducing new considerations regarding the timing of penalty decisions. Drawing on a new
European data set to calculate these additional factors, the optimal penalty is shown to be
approximately 75% of that implied by the conventional formula. (ii) It shows that because penalties
are typically imposed on revenue, a tougher regime may increase cartel overcharges. This calls into
question some recent empirical findings on this issue and the potential benefits of raising penalties.
The issue of optimal penalties for antitrust violations has attracted a lot of attention
among economists1 at least since Landes (1983) applied Becker’s (1968)2 analysis to
provide a first theoretical treatment. In particular, in a series of recent papers, Connor
and Lande (2005, 2006, 2008, 2012) have argued that the prevailing US and European
penalties for antitrust violations – particularly cartels – are too low to generate the
optimal level of deterrence. They draw on a range of empirical evidence to support this
conclusion, a crucial figure being that for the cartel overcharge – the percentage
amount by which the collusive price exceeds that which would obtain in the absence of
the cartel. They draw on an extensive survey by Bulotova and Connor (2006), which
reports a mean value for the cartel overcharge of 29%.3
A significant recent challenge to these conclusions has been made by Allain et al.
(2011), who question two key elements in the Connor and Lande calculations. The first
is the estimate of the average cartel overcharge. Drawing on Boyer and Kotchoni
(2011), they argue that Bulotova and Connor’s estimate suffers from a significant
upward bias, and report that, when these biases are corrected, the mean value for the
cartel overcharge is 17.5%. The second is the use of an annual probability of detection.
They argue that the appropriate probability is that of detection over the lifetime of the
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1 For a recent review of the literature on optimal fines, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000), while for
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cartel, which, being much larger, gives a lower optimal penalty. They conclude that
there is no reason to think existing penalties are too low.
Rather than going from observed levels of overcharges to implied optimal penalties,
another natural and related question to ask is the reverse one: if cartels faced a tougher
penalty regime – by which we mean not just the level of penalty but the anticipated
probability of successful antitrust enforcement – would this result in a lower cartel
overcharge? There has also been some limited empirical work on this issue. Thus,
drawing on their database of 800 cartels across a large number of countries and over a
very long period of time Bulotova and Connor (2006, pp. 1133, 1134) report that
‘cartels … tend to achieve lower overcharges in jurisdictions with strongly enforced
antitrust laws’ and that the size of the overcharge is lower in more recent periods,
especially 1990–2004 ‘when antitrust sanctions were harshest’.
It should be noted that Bulotova and Connor do not attempt to find alternative
explanations of why cartel price overcharges have been falling in more recent
decades. For example, increased globalisation may imply that domestic cartels are
formed under tighter competitive constraints, that is, they are more difficult to
sustain, with excessive overcharges, in markets increasingly open to international
competition. In addition, Boyer and Kotchoni (2011, p. 49) detect no evidence that
cartel overcharges have been affected by the toughness of the penalty regime and
report ‘a fairly homogeneous behavior of cartels across different types, geographical
locations and periods’.
The aim of this article is to contribute to both of these issues. In Section 1, we revisit
the determination of the optimal penalty for antitrust violations and introduce a
number of factors relating to the way that competition cases are handled that have not
so far been taken systematically into account. The existing literature, based on the
economics of crime, effectively assumes that the detection and prosecution of cases
takes place immediately after the action has come to its natural end. However, antitrust
violations can last for many years and competition authorities (CAs) sometimes
intervene and terminate actions before they have come to a natural end.4 On the other
hand, a CA may only reach a decision on a case and impose a penalty long after the
antitrust action has terminated. Each of these two factors raises considerations that
point in different directions for the optimal level of penalty.
If desistance takes place and so an action is stopped before it has reached its natural
end, then the firm will suffer a loss of profits relative to what otherwise might have
happened and so the penalty does not need to be so high to generate the same level of
deterrence. However, on the other hand the revenue base on which the penalty will be
imposed is smaller than it would otherwise have been had the action lasted its
natural life and so the penalty rate has to be higher to achieve the same level of
deterrence.
If a decision can be reached and a penalty imposed long after the action has come to
a natural end then this implies that the probability of effective action ever being taken
is higher than if the action is taken only when the action has reached its natural life –
pointing to a lower penalty. However, the fact that the penalty is imposed much later
4 Put differently, CAs can stop antitrust actions through both desistance and deterrence.
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means that, discounted back to the present, it represents a lower potential cost to the
firm contemplating taking the action, and so the penalty rate needs to be raised to have
the same deterrence effect.
In Section 2, we quantify the resulting optimal penalty, drawing in part on existing
empirical evidence but also on a new database of antitrust actions prosecuted under
Article 102 TFEU by various European competition authorities.5 These data enable us
to calculate the natural life of actions, the fraction terminated prior to the natural life –
and how much sooner this happens – and the fraction that are penalised after the
natural life – and how much later this happens. We show that the combined effect of
these two missing factors is to lower optimal penalties to around 75% of what would
have been predicted using the conventional approach. Overall, our conclusion
supports that of Allain et al. (2011) – that existing penalties are within the range
supported by calculations of optimal penalties.
In Sections 3 and 4, we provide a theoretical framework for thinking about the link
between the ‘toughness of the penalty regime’ and the observed level of cartel
overcharge. We show that this link is far from straightforward and may indeed go in the
opposite direction to that expected. This provides additional reasons for being
cautious about prescriptions for significantly raising the level of penalties.
Our analysis highlights a number of important considerations that need to be taken
into account when considering the effect of fines on cartel overcharges.
(i) First, the effect of fines on overcharges depends on the incidence of the
former, i.e. whether they are imposed on profits or revenues;
(ii) Second, while Bulotova and Connor (2006) associate more ‘strongly enforced’
or ‘more effective’ antitrust law implementation with higher penalties, more
generally, a ‘harsher antitrust enforcement regime’ can also be associated with a
higher probability of being convicted;6
(iii) Third, we distinguish between the case where the penalty regime is
independent of a firm’s actions, and that where either the size of the penalty
(as a proportion of revenue/profits) or the probability of conviction depends
on the price overcharge;
(iv) Fourth, we allow for deterrence effects by examining the impact of the penalty
regime on not just the overcharge set by non-deterred cartels but also on the
number and types of cartels that form.
Section 3 of our article examines the effects of penalties on non-deterred cartels –
the first three issues – while Section 4 considers the implications of deterrence.
We show that the effect of harsher antitrust regimes on cartel overcharges is highly
ambiguous, though generally our results tend to show no effect or the opposite effect
to that reported by Bulotova and Connor (2006). It is mainly when firms anticipate a
stricter regime when their overcharge is higher that we may find theoretical support for
their finding that tougher regimes will lower overcharges.
5 Thus, we no longer rely on evidence relating to just one form of antitrust violation – cartels.
6 This is the probability of being detected multiplied by the probability of being convicted (and hence
penalised) conditional on detection.
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Taken together with the results of Sections 1 and 2 this suggests that one has to be
extremely careful when drawing antitrust fining policy recommendations on the basis
of existing economic models and empirical evidence.
1. Theoretical Derivation of Optimal Antitrust Penalties on the Basis of Price
Overcharges and Other Factors
1.1. Background
The context in which our analysis is set is the following: CAs set out guidance on how
they decide what penalty to impose when a firm7 takes some anti-competitive action
that violates Competition Law. The same guidance applies whatever the nature of this
action.
The ultimate fine paid by any firm depends on a variety of factors which reflect the
extent to which the CA wants to penalise or reward firms for taking other ancillary
actions: e.g. the extent to which they facilitate or hinder an investigation; or whether
they are serial offenders. However, typically CAs start by calculating a basic penalty that
is imposed for taking the anti-competitive action and this is then adjusted to take
account of these other factors.8 It is the calculation of this basic penalty with which we
are concerned.
The starting point for calculating this basic fine is normally the revenue9 that the
firm made in the last year in which the action took place. This could either be the last
year of the natural life of the action if the authority intervenes only after the action has
come to an end, or it could be the last year of an on-going action which the authority
has ordered the firm to cease before it has to come to a natural end. There is then an
adjustment made to take account of the duration of the action – which typically takes
the form of just multiplying the revenue by the number of years over which the action
took place. The basic fine that is set is calculated as a proportion of the last year
revenue adjusted for duration.10 The question is what factor of proportionality should
the CA use to set its penalty?
As we will show, depending on the welfare standard used by a given CA the penalty
will be related to either the harm that the action has caused to others – particularly
consumers – or the benefit that the firm has derived from taking the action. In either
case, CAs start by turning to evidence about price overcharges – the extent to which
prices have been driven by anti-competitive actions – and in particular to evidence
about cartel overcharges, as these have been most extensively analysed.
In this Section, we examine systematically how such overcharge information could
be used to calculate the penalty. We argue that the formula that is often used for doing
this misses some important considerations regarding the timing of decisions by the CA
as to whether or not an action is anti-competitive. For, if it is deemed to be so, then the
7 This should be understood to include the possibility that, in certain situations – e.g. mergers, cartels –
the action may be taken by a group of firms.
8 Bageri et al. (2013) contains a review of how CAs in Europe and US set fines in practice.
9 Bageri et al. (2013) make clear how levying fines on revenue, rather than profits, introduces a number of
distortions.
10 More complex penalty structures have been analysed by, e.g. Motchenkova (2008) and Houba et al.
(2012).
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timing of this decision could potentially curtail the stream of profits arising from the
action and will certainly determine when the fine is imposed. We derive a more general
formula that captures these considerations.
1.1.1. Price overcharge
In common with a lot of the literature, we make the following simplifying assumptions:
there is a market for a homogeneous product in which the production technology is
characterised by constant unit costs; there is an inter-temporally constant price and
output in both the situation where the firm has acted anti-competitively and that in
which it has not.
In the counterfactual situation in which the potentially anti-competitive action had
not been taken, we assume that the firm would have had constant unit costs c0 > 0, the
equilibrium price would have been p0 ≥ c0 and the equilibrium output Q 0 > 0. The
counterfactual price p0 is sometimes known as the ‘but-for’ price. Notice that there is
no presumption that the counter-factual situation is that of perfect competition. There
may be ‘natural’ forces of competition – barriers to entry, limited number of firms –
that would have produced an outcome other than perfect competition.
The firm takes some anti-competitive action which has the effect of not only raising
the price-cost margin but may also have an efficiency effect of lowering costs. As we are
looking at the role of price-overcharge information in setting penalties, we assume that
the former effect dominates the latter and, overall, price increases.11 So formally, once
the action has been taken unit costs are c1; 0\c1 c0 the equilibrium price is p1 > p0
and the equilibrium output is Q1; 0\Q1\Q0.
The price overcharge, h, is the extent to which price is raised above its ‘but-for’ level,
expressed as a fraction of the ‘but-for’ price and so is defined as:
h ¼ Dp
p0
¼ p1  p0
p0
[ 0: ð1Þ
Without loss of generality, we normalise prices by assuming that
p0 ¼ 1; ð2Þ
so the price overcharge reflects both the absolute and the percentage increase in price.
Associated with these two equilibria are revenues Ri ¼ piQi ; i ¼ 0; 1, and profits
pi ¼ Ri  ciQi ¼ ðpi  ciÞQi ; i ¼ 0; 1. We assume that, in the absence of intervention by
a CA, the firm would want to take the action because then it generates a positive
change in profits, i.e. Dp = p1  p0 > 0.
We assume that this action imposes harm on others which is not corrected through
a successful claim for private damage, and so constitutes a genuine externality. In this
article we focus solely on the harm to consumers through the loss of consumer
surplus. To calculate this and relate it in a straightforward way to the price overcharge,
assume a linear demand function which, by a suitable choice of units, can be written
as:
11 In related work, Katsoulacos et al. (2011), we consider the more general case where actions may be on
balance pro-competitive and part of the role of CAs is to try to discriminate between pro and anti-competitive
actions.
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p ¼ ð1þ eÞ  Q ; e[ 0: ð3Þ
Given the normalisation in (2), e ¼ Q0 ¼ ðdp=dQ ÞðQ0=p0Þ and so measures the
inverse elasticity of demand in the ‘competitive’ equilibrium, and is thus a measure of
the underlying competitiveness of the industry in which the action is taking place.12
It also follows from (2) and (3) that:
Q1 ¼ e h; ð4Þ
and so, to ensure positive output and profits when the potentially anti-competitive
action is taken, it must be the case that h < e.
Given this demand function it follows that CSi ¼ 12Q 2i ; i ¼ 0; 1 and so
DCS ¼ CS0  CS1 ¼ 1
2
Q 20  Q 21
 
[ 0; ð5Þ
measures the loss of consumer surplus – the harm – caused by the action.
1.2. Deriving the Optimal Penalty: The Conventional Analysis
To go from this information to a calculation of the required penalty, involves
consideration of a number of different factors. We start by setting out the conventional
analysis in this subsection and then, in the following subsection, consider the
extensions that need to be made to reflect the fact that anti-competitive competitive
actions last a long time and that CAs can intervene either before or after they have
come to a natural end.
1.2.1. Assumptions
To start with, we assume that:
(i) The anti-competitive action lasts for just a single period;
(ii) At the end of the period the firm taking the action faces a probability
v; 0\v 1 of having its action investigated by a CA. We refer to v as the
coverage rate;
(iii) If a firm is investigated, the CA will be able to determine for sure that the action
is anti-competitive (has imposed harm on consumers) and impose a penalty.
We first consider the implications of two different welfare standards.
1.2.2. Total welfare standard – restitutive penalties
Here a firm should take (not take) the action according to whether the private benefit
from doing so is greater than (less than) the social harm. This is the welfare standard
proposed by Connor and Lande (2005, 2006, 2008, 2012), following Landes (1983):
12 Nothing depends on the assumption of a linear demand and indeed much of the literature effectively
uses a linear demand curve as a first-order approximation when calculating the impact of the overcharge on
profits and consumer surplus. If the demand curve is linear, then the units in which price and quantity are
measured can be chosen to reduce this to a single parameter representation and our simple functional form
ensures that this parameter captures an essential feature of the industry – how intrinsically competitive it is, as
measured by elasticity of demand at the but-for price. By measuring elasticity at the but-for price we avoid the
cellophane fallacy.
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Dp DCS 
\
0: ð6Þ
If a firm that obtains the full benefit, Dp > 0, of taking the action faces the
possibility of paying a fine F > 0 with probability v; 0\v 1, then it will take the
action as long as the net benefit is positive, i.e. it will take/not take the action
according to whether:
Dp vF 
\
0: ð7Þ
To line up public with private incentives it is therefore necessary that
vF ¼ DCS : ð8Þ
The penalty here is playing the role of a Pigovian tax on an externality and is not
designed to stop all actions, just to ensure that private decisions to take an action
are lined up with the net social benefits. Expressed as a fraction of revenue earned
by taking the action, the optimal penalty rate under a Total Welfare standard is as
follows:
uTW ¼ F
R1
¼ DCS

R1
v
: ð9Þ
To relate this to the price overcharge note that from (3), (4) and (5) we have the
following:
DCS ¼ 1
2
ðQ1 þ DpÞ2  Q 21
h i
¼ DpQ1 þ ðDpÞ
2
2
;
and so:
DCS
R1
¼ Dp
p1
þ 1
2
Dp
p1
Dp
Q1
¼ h
1þ h 1þ
1
2
h
e h
 
: ð10Þ
Substituting (10) into (9) we get the following:
uTW ¼
h
1þ h 1þ
1
2
h
e h
 
v
: ð11Þ
Notice that if 2(e  h)  1 then we get the approximation:
~uTW ¼ h
v
; ð12Þ
which provides the basis for using the price overcharge as the starting point for
calculating optimal penalties.
1.2.3. Consumer surplus standard – dissuasive penalties
Most CAs use a consumer surplus welfare standard for deciding whether or not actions
are anti-competitive and so should be subject to penalties.13 For example, the 2008
13 See Salop (2010) for arguments in favour of such a standard and Carlton (2007) for arguments in favour
of a total welfare standard.
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European Commission’s Guidance Paper on Art. 102 TFEU14 states (in para. 5) that
the Commission ‘will focus on those types of conduct that are most harmful to
consumers’. The latest version of Merger Guidelines in US15 also clearly states that ‘the
Agency considers whether cognisable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse
the merger’s potential harm to consumers in the relevant market, e.g. by preventing
price increases in that market’.
As all actions of the type we have been considering are harmful, the CA would want
to set a penalty that ensures that no action is profitable. Consequently, expressed as a
fraction of the revenue earned by taking the action, the optimal penalty under a
consumer surplus standard is as follows:
uCS ¼ F
R1
¼ Dp

R1
v
: ð13Þ
Now it is straightforward to show that
Dp
R1
¼ p1  p0
p1
 ðp0  c0ÞðQ0  Q1Þ
p1Q1
þ ðc0  c1Þ
p1
; ð14Þ
where the first term represents the increase in profits through charging a higher price;
the second term represents the extent to which profits would have fallen in the
counterfactual through having lower output, and the third is the increase in profits
through greater efficiency.
If the counterfactual situation were perfectly competitive and there were no
efficiency gains through the action then we would have the approximation:
~uCS ¼ h
ð1þ hÞ
v
; ð15Þ
which, from (11), is smaller than the penalty under a total welfare standard because of
the deadweight loss that is reflected in the total welfare standard. It is also smaller than
the approximation in (12) that gives the conventional approach of using the price
overcharge as the starting point for calculating the optimal penalty.
The expression in (15) will also be correct if it is assumed that, on average, any
efficiency enhancing effects of actions are offset by the reduction in profits in the
counterfactual. Because CAs typically use a consumer surplus welfare standard, in what
follows we will use (15) as the basic formula for the optimal penalty factor, and
consider how this has to be further adjusted in the light of other considerations that
follow from systematically relaxing the assumptions in the base case.
1.2.4. Imperfect decision-making by CA and legal uncertainty
So far we have assumed that the CA can accurately determine whether or not an action
is harmful and that firms know this, so the only uncertainty they face is whether or not
14 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 102 EC Treaty to Abusive
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 3
December 2008.
15 US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Revised
1997) available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html.
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they will be investigated. In Katsoulacos and Ulph (2012a) we have examined the
optimal penalties and the optimal legal standards (effects-based or per se) in situations
where
(i) the CA may make Type I and/or Type II errors;
(ii) there may be legal uncertainty so firms may not fully understand
(a) whether or not their actions are truly harmful and/or
(b) the basis on which the CA will determine whether or not their actions are
harmful.
We show that if the CA can set the optimal penalty then
(i) the optimal legal standard is unambiguously an effects-based standard;
(ii) while the degree of legal uncertainty might affect the optimal penalty that
should be imposed,16 if different firms face different degrees of legal
uncertainty then the CA will still achieve the optimal deterrence by setting a
penalty which, expressed as a fraction of revenue, is given by:
uTW ¼ DCS

R1
vq
; uCS ¼ Dp

R1
vq
; ð16Þ
where q; 0\q\1 is the average probability of the CA deciding that an action
that has been investigated is anti-competitive and a penalty should be
imposed.
Using the approximations in (12) and (15) these equations become as follows:
~uTW ¼ h
vq
; ~uCS ¼ h
ð1þ hÞ
vq
: ð17Þ
The formula in (16) for the optimal penalty under a total welfare standard is
that used by Connor and Lande as a basis for calculating the optimal penalty.
Rather than profilerating formulae and numerical values, in what follows we prefer
to use the formula applicable under a consumer surplus standard, because that is
the de facto standard used by most authorities. Using (17) it is straightforward to
calculate the appropriate value of the optimal penalty under a total welfare
standard.
1.3. Duration
So far we have assumed that the action lasts for a single period, at the end of which the
CA may investigate and impose a penalty. We now take seriously the idea that, in the
absence of any action by a CA, anti-competitive actions may last for many years but that
a CA may either intervene and stop the action before it would otherwise have ended, or
may reach a decision and impose a penalty many years after the action has come to a
natural end.
16 For example, if no firm faced any legal uncertainty then the optimal penalty is given by (15).
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1.3.1. Assumptions
Suppose a firm takes an action. There are a number of features of this action.
(i) It has a natural lifetime of L > 0 periods;17
(ii) There is a probability vb ; 0 vb\1 that, at or before it reaches its natural life,
the CA will have detected that the action has been taken and, following an
investigation, reached a decision as to whether the action is deemed to be
harmful (anti-competitive) or benign (not anti-competitive);
(iii) There is a probability va ; 0 va  1 vb that the CA will reach a decision on
the action after it reaches its natural life. If we assume that CAs can keep
identifying and investigating actions forever, then eventually all actions will be
investigated and so va = 1  vb. However, if there is some time limit beyond
which the CA will not pursue an investigation into an action, then va < 1  vb
and 1  va  vb represent the probability that an action will go unchallenged
by the CA, in which case the firm will derive the per-period increased flow of
profits Dp = p1  p0 > 0 throughout the natural life of the action;
(iv) If the CA’s decision is reached at or before the action has reached its natural
life then, on average, this occurs at date Lb ; 0\Lb L, whereas if it is
reached after the action has reached its natural life then, on average, this
occurs at date La > L;
(v) Irrespective of when the CA reaches its decision, there is a probability
q; 0\q\1 that it will be found to be anti-competitive.
To understand the implications of these assumptions, consider separately the two
possible timing outcomes.
(i) The decision is reached at or before the action has reached its natural life.
With probability ð1 qÞ the CA will conclude that it is benign and so neither
stop nor change the action, which will therefore generate the per-period flow
of profits Dp = p1  p0 > 0 throughout its natural lifetime. However, with
probability, q, the CA will deem the action is anti-competitive and order the
firm to stop the action at date Lb
18 and to pay a penalty that is a proportion
u > 0 of the revenue it has earned up until that date. So the firm will make a
flow of (net) profits that will be Dp  uR1 up until Lb and zero thereafter;
(ii) The CA reaches its decision after the natural life of the action. With probability
ð1 qÞ the CA will retrospectively approve it, and the firm will simply have
earned the per-period flow of increased profits, Dp = p1  p0 > 0 for L
periods. However, with probability, q; 0\ q\ 1, the CA will disapprove of the
action. The firm will still have made the per-period flow of increased profits,
Dp = p1  p0 > 0 throughout the natural lifetime of the action but, at the
time it makes its decision, the CA will impose a penalty that is proportional to
the value of the revenue that the firm earned over the natural lifetime of the
17 In practice this will vary across actions but, for simplicity, we assume all actions have the same natural
life, L.
18 We subsume in this the possibility that the CA may impose remedies that remove the anti-competitive
features of the action. Effectively we assume that, in terms of its impact on profits, this is tantamount to
stopping the action.
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action, namely R1½erL  1=ðr Þ. Discounted back to the time when the firm
takes the action the present value of this penalty is given as
erLauR1½erL  1=ðr Þ ¼ erðLaLÞuR1½1 erL=ðrÞ:
It follows from this that the expected present value of the change in profits from
taking the action is as follows
D ~Pe ¼ vb q
1 erLb
r
 
ðDp uR1Þ þ ð1 qÞ 1 e
rL
r
 
Dp
 
þ va
1 erL
r
 
Dp querðLaLÞR1
	 

þ 1 va  vbð Þ
1 erL
r
 
Dp:
This is equivalent to getting, over the natural life of the action, the per-period flow of
profits
D~pe ¼ 1 qvbð1 kbÞ½ Dp qvbuR1
va
vb
ka þ kb
 
; ð18Þ
where
ka ¼ er ðLaLÞ; kb ¼ 1 e
rLb
1 erL ; 0\kj  1; j ¼ a; b:
19 ð19Þ
It is easy to see that the conventional approach is just a special case of this. In that
approach all decisions aremade just as soon as the natural life of the action has expired –
neither before, nor after. If no decisions aremade after the natural life of the action then
va = 0, while if none are reached before the natural life then Lb = L ⇒ kb = 1. In this
case, the expression in (18) just reduces to the standard formula for expected profits:
D~pe ¼ Dp vbquR1; ð20Þ
where the relevant probability of being investigated is vb  the probability of being
detected by the time the natural life has been reached.
1.3.2. The optimal penalty
If we use a consumer surplus welfare standard the optimal penalty is one that deters all
firms, so we want the lowest penalty that makes expected profits as given by (18) zero.
This implies that
uCS ¼ Dp

R1
qvb
 
1 qvbð1 kbÞ
va
vb
ka þ kb
264
375: ð21Þ
From (16) the first term on the RHS of (21) is just the conventional formula for the
optimal penalty under a consumer-surplus standard,20 where the notation vb just
emphasises that, under the conventional approach, the relevant detection probability is
that of being detected by the time the natural life of the action has been reached.
19 To first order we have approximation: kb  Lb=L.
20 It is the value of the penalty that makes the conventional expression for profits as given by (20) exactly
zero.
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The second term on the RHS of (21) therefore captures all the adjustments that
need to be made to this formula to take account of the possibility that decisions can be
made both before and after the natural life of the action has been reached.
The fact that decisions can be reached before the natural life of the action has been
reached means that Lb < L and so kb < 1, whereas in the conventional approach
Lb = L ⇒ kb = 1. We can see that this has two effects: it reduces both the numerator
and the denominator of the second term. The first effect lowers the optimal penalty –
reflecting the fact that the loss of profits that firms suffer from early intervention itself
acts as a penalty, and so means that the penalty applied by the CA does not need to be
so high to have same deterrent effect. However, the second effect raises the optimal
penalty as the revenue base to which the penalty is applied is also smaller because of
the early intervention.
The fact that the decision can be reached after the natural life of the action has two
effects. First La > L ⇒ ka < 1 whereas, under the conventional approach, ka = 1. As ka
enters the denominator this factor raises the optimal penalty. This reflects the fact that,
with discounting, the additional delay in imposing the penalty reduces its present
value, so the penalty itself has to be higher to have the same deterrent effect. However,
the second effect of having decisions reached after the natural life is that there is now a
higher probability that an action will be dectected at some point – which is reflected in
the fact that va > 0, whereas, under the conventional approach, va = 0. This higher
probability of detection means that the penalty can be reduced and still have the same
level of deterrence.
So, as explained in the introduction, when we allow the possibility that decisions can
be made both before and after an action reaches its natural life, the optimal penalty
has to be adjusted to reflect these two timing considerations, each of which introduces
two facets, one of which increases the penalty and one of which reduces it.
To relate the optimal penalty to the price overcharge, we can use the approxima-
tions in (15) and (17) to get the formula
~uCS ¼ h
ð1þ hÞ
qvb
 
1 qvbð1 kbÞ
va
vb
ka þ kb
264
375: ð22Þ
2. Using Empirical Evidence on Price Overcharge and Other Factors to
Calculate the Optimal Penalty
To obtain the optimum penalty as given by (22), it is necessary to calculate the
following:
● the penalty that would emerge from the conventional formula – the expression
in the first bracket on RHS of (22);
● the adjustment that needs to be made to account for the timing considerations
introduced insubsection 1.3– theexpression in the secondbracketonRHSof (22).
As there is an extensive literature on the penalty implied by the conventional
formula, our primary focus will be on the adjustment factor.
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2.1. Adjustment Factor
To calculate this we have used a new data set that we have compiled. This relates to
abuse of dominance cases investigated by various European national competition
authorities between 1990 and 2010. We have a sample of 32 such cases where we know
the dates on which the action started and stopped; the date on which the decision was
made by the CA and what that decision was. A Table setting out the basic data on which
all the calculations set out below are based is presented in Appendix A.
Using this information we identified two subgroups of cases. The first was a group of
cases which had run their natural life. We put an action in this category if either
(i) the date at which the CA made its decision was after the date at which the
action had ceased or
(ii) the CA did not find the action to be anti-competitive as reflected in the fact
that the CA imposed neither any penalty nor any conditions on the action.
For actions satisfying this second condition, the date of the decision could be later
than, the same as or earlier than the date at which the action came to an end and,
indeed, in some instances there was no stop date for the action which was presumed to
be still active at the time the data were gathered – 2010. Of the 32 cases, 23 fell into this
first category and had an average duration of 5.8 years. Given that some of them could
have continued beyond 2010, in what follows we will take it that the natural life of
actions is six years. That is L = 6.21 For those cases where the decision was reached after
the action had come to an end, the decision came 3.6 years after the action had ceased.
So La = 9.6 ⇒ La  L = 3.6.
The second subgroup of cases was actions which had ended through the actions of the
CA before they reached their natural life. An action was put in this category if the date at
which the action came to an end was the same as that when the CAmade its decision and
the CA decided that the action was anti-competitive and imposed either a penalty or
certain conditions that effectively brought the action in its original form to an end. There
were nine actions in this category and their average duration was 5.1 years. So Lb = 5.1.
The implied values of ka ; kb depend on the assumed interest rate. From (19) a central
valueof r = 0.05would imply that: ka ¼ 0:835; kb ¼ 0:868; a valueof r =0.025would imply
ka ¼ 0:914; kb ¼ 0:859; while a value r = 0.1 would imply ka ¼ 0:698; kb ¼ 0:885. So the
two parameters move in different directions with the interest rate, with ka being the
more sensitive of the two.
As 20 of the 32 actions were found to be anti-competitive it follows that the average
probability of an action being judged anti-competitive conditional on being investi-
gated is q ¼ 58 ¼ 0:625.22
21 This is consistent with the evidence for cartels. In the sample of cartels used by Boyer and Kotchoni
(2011) the average length of life of a cartel is nine years, though Allain et al. (2011) use a figure of six years in
their calculation. Connor (2011) reports that other studies put cartel life between two and eight years, while,
using his sample, he calculated a mean duration of seven years and a median duration of just under five.
22 This is arguably compatible with the evidence for cartels. Boyer and Kotchoni (2011) show that the
average probability of being disallowed or convicted is 0.66 for the entire sample used by Bulotova and
Connor (2006) but that it is 0.72 for the more restricted set of cartels they use for their analysis. The
somewhat lower figure of 0.625 for abuse of dominance cases could be argued to reflect the less cut-and-dried
nature of the offence.
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The final parameters we need to calculate are va and vb. To do so we exploit two final
pieces of information from our data set
● In our sample, in 21 of the 32 cases a decision was reached in less than six years
of the start of the action, so vb=ðva þ vbÞ ¼ 2132 ¼ 0:656  23.
● The maximum time lapse between an action’s starting and a decision being
reached was 15 years.23 So in what follows we will assume that if a decision has
not been made on an action within 15 years of its initiation then the action will
have escaped the attention of the CA.
As reported in Allain et al. (2011), a number of studies suggest that the annual
probability of detection is around 0.15.24 Assuming this was also the annual probability
of a decision being reached on a case, then the probability that a decision would be
made within 15 years would be va + vb = 0.913,
25 while the probability that it would be
reached within six years would be vb = 0.623. This implies a value of r ¼ vb=v ¼ 0:682,
which is somewhat higher that the the value of r = 0.66 that we observe on our
data set.
However, it is arguable that, given the delay in carrying out an investigation and
reaching a decision, the annual probability of reaching a decision should be lower than
the annual probability of detection alone. Assuming that the annual probability of a
decision being reached takes the slightly lower value of 0.14, then we get
v = va + vb = 0.896; vb = 0.596 and so we get the observed value of r = 0.66.
Consequently in what follows we will assume an annual probability of decision-making
of 0.14 and that va þ vb ¼ 0:9; vb ¼ 0:6) va ¼ 0:3.
Putting all this together, it turns out that with our central value of r = 0.05 and
with Lb ¼ 5:1;L ¼ 6;L ¼ 9:6; q ¼ 0:625; va ¼ 0:3; vb ¼ 0:6 then, from the formula
given in (22) the value of the adjustment factor is 0.74.
To assess how sensitive this adjustment factor is to the assumed values of some of the
parameters, the calculation was performed for three values of the interest rate, namely
r ¼ 0:025; 0:05; 0:1 and three values of the probability of conviction q ¼ 0:625; 0:65;
0:7 where the latter reflect values reported in other studies. The results are shown in
Table 1.
The conclusion is that the adjustment factor does not seem very sensitive to either of
these two parameters.
23 Again this is not inconsistent with evidence from the literature on cartels. For example, commenting on
the Saint-Gobain Car Glass Cartel, Stephan (2009) reports ‘the French glass producer Saint-Gobain was fined
a staggering €896 million for its involvement in the infringement. Typically, this fine was imposed more than
a decade after the anti-competitive behaviour was first instigated and some nine years after the infringement
ceased’.
24 An early paper by Bryant and Eckard (1991) put the figure between 0.13 and 0.17. Similar figuress have
been reported by Combe et al. (2008), Connor (2011) and Ormosi (2011). Of course, although a widely used
assumption, there is in general no reason to think that the annual probability of detection is constant.
However, given that we do not observe how many actions go undetected, we need such an identifying
restriction to calculate va ; vb and hence the fraction of undetected actions, which our calculations suggest is
10%.
25 This follows from the formula that if q is the (constant) annual probability of a decision being reached,
then the probability of a decision being reached within T years is 1  (1  q)T.
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2.2. Conventional Formula
If we use the Bulotova and Connor (2006) value of h = 0.3 for the price overcharge,
then, with vb = 0.6 and q ¼ 0:625, the optimal penalty as given by the conventional
formula (17) would be euCS ¼ 0:62. If instead we used the Boyer and Kotchoni (2011)
value for the overcharge of h = 0.175, this would produce a figure of euCS ¼ 0:40. Using
a higher figure for the probability of conviction that has been found in cartel cases,
namely, q ¼ 0:7, would lower these figures to euCS ¼ 0:55 and 0:3526 respectively.
Combining the conventional formula and the adjustment factor we see that the
optimal penalty would lie between
● 25% and 31% if the overcharge were 17.5%;
● 40% and 48% if the overcharge were 30%.
So we conclude that:
(i) the conventional approach ignores important features relating to the timing
of decisions by competitions authorities and consequently produces a figure
for the optimal penalty that is too high, the correct figure being around 75%
of that generated by the conventional formula;
(ii) the optimal penalty is sensitive to the price overcharge, but would be around
30% if we use Boyer and Kotchoni (2011) figure which corrects for the biases
in the Bulotova and Connor (2006) figures.
3. The Impact of Tougher Penalty Regimes on the Price Overcharge:
Non-deterred Cartels
In this Section and in the next we derive comparative static predictions about the effect
of the toughness of the penalty regime on the cartel overcharge. Throughout, we
simplify by assuming that
(i) production takes place under constant average and marginal costs, c,
(ii) the counterfactual is perfectly competitive and
(iii) there are no efficiency effects of cartels.
In this Section we also neglect the deterrence effects of penalties – we return to this
in Section 5. If a cartel is detected and convicted, it will be liable to a penalty, which, in
Table 1
Sensitivity of Adjustment Factor
r = 0.025 r = 0.05 r = 0.1
q ¼ 0:625 0.72 0.74 0.78
q ¼ 0:65 0.72 0.74 0.77
q ¼ 0:7 0.71 0.73 0.77
26 Given that, for example, the Office of Fair Trading and the European Commission currently impose
baseline penalties of 10% of revenue, these figures illustrate how Connor and Lande (2012) come to the
conclusion that, to generate effective deterrence, penalties should be at least quintupled.
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general, can have a fixed part and a variable part, where the latter can be a percentage
of the profits or revenues of the colluding firms. In this Section the fixed part plays no
role so we assume it is zero. A crucial issue is whether the penalty is imposed on profits
or revenue. We distinguish a number of cases.
3.1. Toughness of Antitrust Regime Unrelated to Overcharge
The question we are interested in is how, anticipating the probability of being
investigated, found to be anti-competitive, and penalised, the cartel will set its profit-
maximising price and output.
3.1.1. Case A: Fines on revenues
If the fine is levied on revenue then, from (18), expected cartel profits are as follows:
PðQ Þ ¼ ½1 bð1þ wÞ RðQ Þ  ð1 bÞcQ ; ð23Þ
where b ¼ qvb 1 kbð Þ is a measure of the probability of effective enforcement, and
w ¼ u
va
vb
ka þ kb
1 kb
0@ 1A
measures the penalty rate – both being scaled to reflect the factors relating to timing of
investigations introduced in subsection 1.3.
We can re-write (23) as
PðQ Þ ¼ ð1 bÞ½ð1 aÞRðQ Þ  cQ ; ð24Þ
where a ¼ bw=ð1 bÞ, is increasing in both b and w and serves as a combined measure
of the toughness of the penalty regime. Assuming declining marginal revenue – the
usual second-order condition for profit maximisation – then, as noted first in Bageri,
Katsoulacos and Spagnolo (2013), it is clear that:
(i) the cartel output (price) is lower (higher) if the penalty is imposed on revenue
than if it is imposed on profits;
(ii) if the penalty is imposed on revenue, a tougher penalty regime – higher value
of a – will result in a higher cartel price/overcharge.
The intuition is straightforward. With a penalty applied to revenue, a profit
maximising firm will seek to reduce the penalty, which it does by reducing revenue. But
since, with positive marginal costs, marginal revenue is positive, to reduce revenue it
reduces output and raises price. The tougher the penalty the greater is this effect.
3.1.2. Case B: Fines on profits
If, instead, the fine is levied on profits, then from (23) the expected cartel profits are
given by:
PðQ Þ ¼ ½1 bð1þ wÞ½RðQ Þ  cQ  ¼ ð1 bÞð1 aÞ½RðQ Þ  cQ : ð25Þ
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Clearly the optimal cartel output is the (un-distorted) monopoly output that the cartel
would choose in the absence of penalties, and consequently the cartel price/
overcharge is unaffected by the toughness of the penalty regime.
So we have the following:
PROPOSITION 1. If the fine is proportional to profit the toughness of the penalty regime does not
affect the cartel overcharge. If it is proportional to revenue, a tougher penalty regime – higher value
of a – will result in a higher cartel price/overcharge.
Both parts of this result are inconsistent with the conclusions of Bulotova and Connor
(2006). In part this could be because, as indicated in the introduction, the empirical
evidence supporting this conclusion is rather limited. There are some comparisons
across time and across jurisdictions but we lack a wealth of studies that carefully
control for all the potential explanatory factors that might be driving overcharges –
e.g. globalisation. It is possible that when these are included the empirical results would
be consistent with our prediction. However, it may also be that this is just too simple a
model, so in what follows we extend the model in a number of directions.
3.2. Toughness of Antitrust Regime Endogenous
One possible explanation for the above finding is that firms taking anti-competitive
actions do not expect that the probability of being caught or the penalty imposed if
caught might depend on the extent of the price overcharge. To allow for this
possibility, assume, first, that the probability of effective enforcement is a strictly
increasing function of the cartel price/overcharge,27 p, and that the function b(p)
satisfies the equation:
bð1Þ ¼ 0; and 8p 1; bðpÞ\1; b0ðpÞ[ 0; b00ðpÞ\0:
3.2.1. Case A: Fines on revenue
When fines are levied on revenues then, from (23), expected profit becomes as
follows:
PðQ Þ ¼ f1 b½pðQ Þð1þ wÞg RðQ Þ  cf1 b½pðQ Þg Q ; ð26Þ
so profit maximisation implies that:
ð1 bÞ½ð1 aÞR 0ðQ Þ  c  ðb0p0f½RðQ Þ  cQ  þ wRðQ ÞgÞ ¼ 0: ð27Þ
The second term on the LHS of (27) is negative and so implies that the cartel sets
a higher output and lower price than it would have done if the probability of
successful enforcement were independent of the cartel price. However, because of
the distortion implied by the first term on the LHS of (27) this could still be
consistent with marginal revenue being above marginal cost and so the effect of the
penalty’s being levied on revenue could still be to push price above the monopoly
price. Furthermore,
27 Houba et al. (2010, 2012) also explore the possibility that penalties might be related to the cartel’s
price/overcharge.
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PQw ¼ b½R 0ðQ Þ  c  b0p0RðQ Þ: ð28Þ
Given that p 0 < 0 and b0 < 0, this expression is unambiguously positive if R 0
(Q)  c < 0 and so the cartel sets a price below the monopoly price but otherwise
the sign depends on the relative magnitude of the two terms.
PROPOSITION 2.
(i) If the penalty is imposed on revenue and if the probability of effective enforcement is greater
the higher is the price, then price will be lower than it would have been had the probability of
effective enforcement been unaffected by the price overcharge.
(ii) If price is below the monopoly price then an increase in the penalty unambiguously lowers
the price overcharge. Otherwise, it could still be the case that tougher penalties are
associated with higher price overcharges.
3.2.2. Case B: Fines on profits
From (25), expected profit becomes as follows:
PðQ Þ ¼ f1 b½pðQ Þð1þ wÞg½RðQ Þ  cQ ; ð29Þ
and is therefore maximised when:
ðf1 b½pðQ Þð1þ wÞg½R 0ðQ Þ  cÞ  fb0p0ð1þ wÞ½RðQ Þ  cQ g ¼ 0; ð30Þ
and so, as the second term in braces on the LHS of (30) is negative, it must be the case
that the cartel produces where R 0(Q)  c < 0 – i.e. marginal revenue is less than
marginal cost, and so operates with a higher output, lower price, than in the case where
the probability of investigation is unaffected by the price overcharge. Furthermore, it is
easy to see from (30), that, because R 0(Q)  c < 0, it follows that:
PQw ¼ b½R 0ðQ Þ  c  b0p0½RðQ Þ  cQ [ 0; ð31Þ
so a higher penalty will cause the cartel to increase its output and lower its price/
overcharge. So we have the following:
PROPOSITION 3.
(i) If the penalty is imposed on profits and if the probability of effective enforcement is greater
the higher is the price, then price will be lower than the monopoly price that would have
been set had the probability of effective enforcement been unaffected by the price overcharge;
(ii) an increase in the penalty unambiguously lowers the price overcharge.
While this result is consistent with the Bulotova and Connor (2006) finding that
tougher antitrust enforcement lowers the price overcharge, in practice CAs levy
penalties on revenue and not on profits and, as we have seen above in that case it
could still be true that tougher penalties are associated with higher price
overcharges.
In the above analysis it is the probability of effective enforcement that depends on
the price overcharge. If the penalty (as a proportion of revenue or profits) depends on
price overcharge then essentially the same results go through – see Katsoualcos and
Ulph (2012b).
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4. The Impact of Tougher Penalty Regimes on the Price Overcharge:
Deterrence Effects
To introduce deterrence effects in the analysis stated above we examine a less general
model than we used in previous Section. Specifically, we:
(i) restrict attention to the realistic case where the penalty is imposed on revenue;
(ii) introduce a fixed component to the penalty, so the fine is now
wRðQ Þ þ j; w[ 0; j[ 0;28
(iii) use the demand function p ¼ ð1þ eÞ  Q ; e[ 0 that we introduced – (3) –
in Section 2. As we noted there, the parameter e provides a one-dimensional
measure of the degree of competitiveness of different industries and the larger
is e the more uncompetitive is the industry.
Thus, expected cartel profits are given by:
PðQ Þ ¼ ð1 bÞfð1 aÞ½ð1þ eÞQ  Q 2  Qg  bj; ð32Þ
where, as before, a ¼ bw=ð1 bÞ is increasing in both b and w and provides a measure
of the toughness of the penalty regime. It is easy to see29 that this implies that the
profit-maximising output will be positive iff:
e[ e ¼ a
1 a [ 0; ð33Þ
in which case the profit-maximising output and price are as follows:
Q  ¼ 1
2
e a
1 a
	 

; p ¼ 1
2
ð1þ eÞ þ 1
1 a
 
; ð34Þ
and so, as we know from Result 1, the price set by non-deterred cartels, is a strictly
increasing function of the penalty toughness parameter, a, as well as the inverse
elasticity, e.
The maximum profits made by the cartel are given by
Pðe; b;w; jÞ ¼ 1
4
ð1 bÞð1 aÞ e a
1 a
	 
2
bj; ð35Þ
and so a cartel will form only if these are positive, which is true iff
e[ e ¼ a
1 aþ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bj
ð1 bÞð1 aÞ
s
[ e; ð36Þ
in which case the cartel’s price and output are given by (34). Notice that e is a strictly
increasing function of the penalty regime parameters (w, j, b).
We can now investigate the implications of changes in the penalty regime parameters
for the average price overcharge taking into account the effect of the changes in the
penalty regime on deterrence – i.e. on the number of cartels actually formed.
28 Alternatively, this could be thought of as some other form of fixed cost.
29 For a more detailed exposition of the section, see Katsoualcos and Ulph (2012b).
© 2013 The Author(s).
The Economic Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons on behalf of the Royal Economic Society.
F576 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ N O V E M B E R
4.1. Antitrust Regime Independent of Cartel Price/Overcharge
Assume first that none of the penalty regime parameters depends on the price
overcharge – the antitrust regime is exogenous.
4.1.1. Effect of an increase in j
This has no direct effect on the price overcharge of any cartel that is formed, however,
it increases e and so fewer cartels form and those that do form come from less
competitive environments, so, on average, the price overcharge will be increased.
4.1.2. Effect of an increases in b and/or w
As noted in Result 1 this has the direct effect of increasing the price/overcharge of
those cartels that form but also has the indirect effect of increasing e, so fewer cartels
form and those that do form come from less competitive environments, thus
reinforcing the direct effect. So unambiguously the average price overcharge is
increased.
So we reach the following overall conclusion:
PROPOSITION 4. With endogenous deterrence, an increase in the toughness of the antitrust
regime (increase in parameters b, w, j) will lead to an increase in the average price overcharge, as
fewer cartels form, and those that do form come from environments that are, on average, less
competitive. This positive indirect deterrence effect reinforces whatever direct effects the tougher
penalty regime might have on the cartel overcharge – Result 1.
4.2. Antitrust Regime Depends on the Overcharge
We saw in the previous Section that if penalties are imposed on revenue then if either
the probability of effective enforcement, b, or the factor relating the penalty to
revenue, w, depend on the cartel price/overcharge then although this will lead the
cartel to set a lower price than it might otherwise have done, and although this could
lead to the possibility that a tougher regime results in a lower overcharge, nevertheless
the forces at work in Result 1 were still in play and it is possible that the tougher regime
results in a higher overcharge.
In this section, we explore the implications of allowing the fixed component of
the penalty,30 j, to depend on the price overcharge. So assume now that j is
made up of a fixed part and a part that increases with the price overcharge –
decreases with cartel output. Specifically let us suppose that the penalty regime can
be characterised by
j ¼ j0  j1Q : ð37Þ
An increase in j1 toughens the penalty regime by making the penalty that the cartel
pays more sensitive to the price overcharge: lowering Q, thus increasing the
overcharge, increases the penalty more, the greater is j1.
It is straightforward to show that the critical value of the inverse elasticity above
which a cartel will form is given by
30 That is, the component of the penalty that does not depend on revenue.
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e ¼ a
1 a
n
1 aþ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bj0
ð1 bÞð1 aÞ
s
; ð38Þ
and that the profit-maximising output and price of those cartels that do form are
given by:
Q  ¼ 1
2
e a
1 aþ
n
1 a
 
; p ¼ 1
2
ð1þ eÞ þ 1
1 a
n
1 a
 
; ð39Þ
where
n ¼ bj1ð1 bÞ : ð40Þ
It follows that as j1 increases, this has two effects: it has a direct effect of reducing the
price of those cartels that do form (from (39); but it also has the indirect effect of
inducing more cartels to form and, moreover, they come on average from more
competitive environments (from (38)), which causes the average overcharge of
observed cartels to fall. The two effects reinforce one another so, on average, the cartel
overcharge falls – which is the Bulotova and Connor result. So we have the following:
PROPOSITION 5. An increase in the tougheness of the penalty regime, that arises through
raising the rate at which the fixed component of the penalty falls with cartel output, will
unambiguously cause the average observed cartel overcharge to fall. It has both a direct incentive
effect that induces those cartels that form to set a lower price/overcharge and an indirect effect of
inducing more cartels to form from environments that are, on average, more competitive.
We can summarise this Section by saying that for the range of cases we have
examined, the deterrence effects of tougher antitrust regimes reinforce their direct
impact on the prices set be non-deterred cartels. While we can now find one dimension
of the penalty regime – the extent to which any fixed penalty is related to the price/
overcharge set by the cartel – where a toughening of the regime unambiguously results
in a lower cartel overcharge, for many other dimensions it remains the case that a
tougher regime increases the overcharge.
5. Conclusions
The analysis given above provides a number of extensions to the theory of antitrust
fines which we have used, with existing and new data sets, to contribute to a better
understanding of the current fining policies of CAs. In particular, the analysis
extends the theory linking cartel overcharges to optimal fines by introducing a
number of additional considerations that are important in fine setting, specifically,
legal uncertainty; the fact that CAs sometimes intervene and terminate antitrust
actions before they have come to a natural end; and the fact that penalties are
often imposed after the antitrust action has terminated. We quantify the resulting
optimal penalty, drawing in part on existing empirical evidence but also on a new
database of antitrust actions prosecuted under Article 102. We show that the
combined effect of the second and third of the above missing factors depends
© 2013 The Author(s).
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crucially on what figure is used for the overcharge. Overall our conclusion supports
that of Allain et al. (2011) – that existing penalties are within the range supported
by calculations of optimal penalties.
We also examine the reverse issue of how the toughness of the antitrust regime
affects the level of cartel overcharges. We examine this issue under a very wide range of
different circumstances and we show that the effects are highly ambiguous, thus again
questioning some of the recent empirical findings on this issue. We conclude that
there is no good theoretical ground for believing that a tougher regime will necessarily
lead to lower overcharges.
Appendix A: Data Appendix
In this Appendix, (Tables A1, A2) we set out for each of the 32 cases in our sample the data
relating to:
(i) the timing of the actions;
(ii) the timing of the relevant CA’s decisions on those actions;
(ii) the nature of the relevant CA’s decision.
We group the data into two subsets: those for whom, using the criteria set out in the text, it could
be said that the action lasted its natural life; those for whom it could be said the action was
stopped by the CA before it reached its natural life.
Table A1
Cases that Lasted Their Natural Life
Dates of
action
Decision
date Decision
Duration
of action
Time to
penalty
2002–4 2006 F 3 2
2001–5 2005 N 5 n/a
1993–9 2005 F 7 6
1995–9 2005 F 5 6
2001–5 2009 F 5 4
2001–6 2009 F 6 3
2002–6 2006 N 5 n/a
1997–2001 2005 N 5 n/a
2002–5 2005 N 4 n/a
1999–2000 2007 F 2 7
2004–6 2009 N 3 n/a
1999–2003 2004 N 5 n/a
2001–3 2006 N 3 n/a
1997–2000 2004 F 4 4
1997–2000 2006 F 4 6
2002–10 2004 N 9 n/a
2002–10 2004 N 9 n/a
2002–10 2006 N 9 n/a
1991–2003 2006 F 13 3
2002–10 2006 N 9 n/a
2000–10 2010 N 11 n/a
2005 2006 F 1 1
2005–9 2010 F 5 1
Cases: 23 Fines: 11 Average = 5.8 Average = 3.6
Notes. Notation regarding decisions: F, fine imposed; C, conditions imposed; N, no
fine, no conditions.
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